U-387 submarine
Excerpt from the
historical overview
SOLVING THE MYSTERIES
A.Ya. Kuznetsov
A.V. Kornis
D.A. Ukryukov
Although more than 70 years have passed since the end of the war, it is still not fully known what losses the Soviet Navy inflicted on the enemy's submarine forces, including in the northern theater of operations. The very nature of submarine warfare has contributed to the fact that one can only make guesses about the fate of many submarines.
The most interesting in this regard are the U-387 and especially the U-286 submarines, their fates were the least clear. This article is mainly devoted to them.
U-387
U-387 - type VIIC submarine, entered service on 11.22.42, commanded by Lieutenant Commander Buhler. Her last campaign began on 21.11.44 in Narvik. After entering Harstad, U-387 unsuccessfully operated in the Stier group against convoy JW-62. On December 1, she was included in the Grube group and occupied a position in the Iokanga area until December 5, when, together with U-997, she entered the Stock group. On December 7, the Murmansk part of convoy JW-62 entered the Kola Bay without losses, and the Stoсk group operated on our coastal communications while waiting for the return convoy RA-62 to leave. U-387 took the "Stock 4" position east of the Rybachy Peninsula. On the evening of December 8, the commander of submarines in the Arctic ordered the submarines in the Rybachy area to stay closer to the shore. There, on the one hand, it was more difficult to detect them, and on the other hand, it was easier for them to intercept coastal convoys from Kola Bay to Petsamo. The last message from U-387 was sent at 00:31 (02:31 Moscow time) on December 9 from the square AC 8827, i.e. close to Rybachy, slightly to the west of the position "Stock 4".
The British Admiralty has believed since 1946 that the Bamborough Castle corvette sank U-387 with a Squid bomb at 6941' north, 3312' east.
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On December 10, convoy RA-62 was scheduled to leave the Kola Bay. The night before, the 7th escort group (sloops "Signet", "Lapwing", corvettes "Allington Castle" and "Bamborough Castle") left Vaenga at 15:00 with the task of clearing the area south of 69°59' N between the 33rd and 35th meridians from submarines. The ships were combing the area in front formation, "Bamborough Castle" was on the extreme left. At 19:31, his radar detected a target at a distance of 5,700 yards (approximately 5,200 m), but after 6 minutes contact was lost. The corvette slowed down to 6 knots to replace the failed ship noise simulator, and dropped a depth charge just in case. At 19:38, it was possible to establish sonar contact at a distance of 1400 yards. The hydroacoustic station "147B" determined that the submarine was going at a depth of 360 feet (110 m) at a speed of 3 knots. The commander of the group on the sloop "Signet" headed to the place of attack, and "Lapwing" and "Allington Castle" were ordered to act according to the plan "Keeper". At 19:58, Bamborough Castle launched its first Squid attack. According to sonar data, the German boat did not perform an evasive maneuver before the attack and, apparently, did not suspect that the ship went on the attack. No signs of damage were found, contact was restored after 2 minutes, when the water calmed down after the explosions. At 20:05, a second salvo followed - again without apparent success. Contact was restored again at 20:29. The commander of the Bamborough Castle, Lieutenant Commander of the Reserve Wark, a fairly experienced anti-submarine officer, took his corvette to a distance big enough for a Squid attack, and at 20:57 fired another salvo. Contact with the boat was lost and was not resumed. But an oil stain appeared on the surface, with floating fragments of boards (possibly deck flooring) floating in the center of it. The corvette, constrained in maneuvering due to the towing of the ship noise simulators, did not catch them. The spot gradually increased. The crews of the corvette "Bamborough Castle" and the sloop "Signet" felt the characteristic smell of diesel fuel. However, attempts to take fuel samples did not lead to anything. The search continued until 23:35. Actually, the group should have stayed here until morning, but the place of attack lay away from the future path of the convoy, and planes from the aircraft carrier "Nairana" found two submarines to the east. In this regard, the 7th escort group went to search for them.
During the war, the British Anti-Submarine Warfare Assessment Committee was not sure of the success of the attack. Obviously, the reason for this was the lack of convincing signs of damage to the submarine, as well as conflicting data from sonar stations.
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In Soviet sources, the death of this boat was attributed to the destroyer Zhivuchiy (commanded by the captain of the 3rd rank Ryabchenko). On December 8, the commander of the Northern Fleet ordered a search for submarines along the Murmansk coast. At 17:00, the destroyer leader Baku under the flag of Rear Admiral Fokin and five destroyers left Iokanga. In pairs, they headed to the west. 7 miles from the shore were "Gremyashchiy" and "Doblestny", 10 miles offshore – "Baku" and "Derzky", 10 miles north of this pair - "Razumny" and "Zhivuchiy". All of them had radar stations and Lend-Lease sonar. After a while, the destroyers entered the Grube group's line of positions at an acute angle. At 22:45, the right-flank "Zhivuchiy" detected with the help of a radar a target at a distance of about 4 miles and began to approach at a speed of 24 knots. At 22:52, "Zhivuchiy" fired two lighting projectiles and the crew saw the submarine almost in front of their vessel at a distance of less than 100 m. At 22:53, the "Zhivuchiy" opened fire with semi-armor-piercing
102 mm shells. Allegedly, the submarine managed to release two torpedoes from the stern devices (but there was only one stern device on type VII submarines, and there were no other submarines in the Arctic). At 22:54, the destroyer at the 69°05'N. 38°21'E. rammed the boat at an angle of 30° to the left side behind the deckhouse. At the time of the ram, there were four people on the bridge of the submarine who were "frantically shouting and waving their hands." The destroyer fired at point-blank range from all the guns that could be deployed towards the target. The personnel observed hits of four 102-mm and many 20-mm shells. The boat went underwater with a big roll to starboard. At 22:56, the destroyer dropped a series of depth charges 50 m from the visible part of the cabin (it did not have time to turn around and pass over the dive site). The boat finally disappeared 4 minutes after the impact. At 23:10 the bombing was repeated. At 23:27, Razumny conducted three depth charge attacks in the area of the ram from 23:27 to 23:47, according to sonar data, after which it turned on the searchlight and at 23:50 found wooden fragments that could have been the deck deck of a submarine. In addition, a dull underwater explosion was heard at 23:38.
However, nowadays there is no doubt that the "Zhivuchiy" attacked U-1163. This ram is described in the submarine's combat operations log, the timing is almost the same (the difference is only 2 minutes), the location is slightly to the north of the position where U-1163 was supposed to be. All shells passed above the submarine due to the limitation on the angle of inclination of the guns. The boat was seriously damaged by the ram attack, but was able to go underwater, evade further attacks and return to the base, where it was repaired and went on a new campaign on January 28.
For a long time there was hope that the U-387 was sunk by the destroyers "Razumny", "Zhivuchiy", "Derzky" or leader "Baku", which between 05:30 and 06:16 on 09.12.44 conducted several attacks on the approaches to the Kola Bay according to sonar data. However, judging by the combat operations log, only one of the submarines (or even the only one) that was attacked by our destroyers was U-318. She was not hit by depth charges, but when dodging she hit the bottom and received some damage.
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U-286
U-286, a VIIC type submarine, commissioned 05.06.43, commanded by Oberleutnant Dietrich. For a long time, not a single fact was reliably known about the last campaign of U-286, even its date remained in question. In foreign literature, the reason for the death of the submarine was considered to be the attack of the frigates of the 19th escort group "Loch Insh", "Anguilla" and "Cotton" on April 29, in Soviet and Russian works - the attack of the destroyer "Karl Liebknecht" at 09:06-09:11 on 22.04.45. However, in the "Combat Chronicle of the Navy", this version is considered controversial.
Now we can definitely say that U-286 left Harstad on April 17. The boat never got in touch again, which left a wide variety of possible outcomes. On the submarine itself, the commander of the submarine forces in Norway, Fregatten-Captain Suren, transmitted several orders, thanks to which it is possible to outline the events of her last campaign. Initially, the boat was included in the Faust group formed on April 17, which was supposed to intercept the convoy JW-66 that left England on April 16 east of Medvezhiy Island. However, the German radio intelligence only succeeded in finding out when the JW-66 left the base. Having no data about the convoy and fearing to miss it, on April 20, Suren gave the following orders to the Faust group: if the convoy is not detected by midnight on April 21/22, then at 00:00 on April 22 (01:00 Moscow time), the Faust group has go at full speed to the Murmansk area. An hour before the deadline, Suren repeated the order,having specified the coordinates of the line to be occupied by the Faust group (seaward of the Kildin – Teribersky Peninsula line).
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These facts are interesting primarily because they exclude the possibility of U-286 appearing at the site of the famous Karl Liebknecht attack at 09:06-09:11 on April 22. For the remaining 8-9 hours, U-286, under the most favorable conditions, would be able to cover only half of the required distance to the place of "meeting" with the destroyer.
In Russian and Soviet works, the death of U-286 was previously attributed to the escort of the convoy PK-9 (Petsamo - Kola Bay) on April 22. As far as it can be established now, this convoy met only two submarines on its way. U-294 made an attack at the northwestern tip of the Rybachy Peninsula and heard two explosions. The convoy, which was really here at the specified time, did not record the explosions and the boat itself, did not suffer any losses. At the same time, U-294 reported damage that forced her to interrupt the campaign (the lid of the 5th torpedo tube was jammed in the open position, the air supply pipe to the diesel engines and the ventilation pipe were flooded at the schnorchel). Given the absence of attacks from our side and direct indications in the radiogram of the combat nature of the damage, it may be concluded that those were technical problems (possibly the result of hitting the bottom after exiting the attack). Further on, U-997 appeared on the way of the convoy. At 00:38, even before the approach of the PK-9, it was attacked by Captain Lyatin's Catalina (118th Separate Reconnaissance Regiment). As a result, the 3rd ventilation shaft of the starboard side failed. But this did not prevent the commander of the submarine, Oberleutnant Lehman, from aggressive action towards the convoy. At 06:18, the destroyer Karl Liebknecht detected her by sonar, and from that moment U-997 was attacked by convoy guards. Nevertheless, at 08:41 she torpedoed the transport "Idefjord", and at 08:43 - the transport "Onega". "Idefjord" managed to be towed to Murmansk, "Onega" sank. At 09:06, Liebknecht rediscovered the submarine and dropped the remaining depth charges on it. Then there was what was later considered the sinking of U-286. At 09:10, a submarine with a broken conning tower, bent periscopes and broken hand ropes surfaced at a 45° starboard heading angle 50 m from the destroyer. At the same moment, the Liebknecht opened fire from everything that could shoot. Before the boat sank (or went underwater) a minute later, the destroyer managed to fire 16 102mm shells, 17 37mm shells and 22 12.7mm cartridges. 102 mm projectile hits were observed. Unfortunately, the observations made in the heat of battle turned out to be inaccurate. In the radio message from U-997 about the actions against the convoy, only two damages were mentioned: one as a result of "Catalina" attack, and the second due to depth charge explosions (the left propeller shaft failed). Apparently, the U-997, which accidentally jumped to the surface for a short time, did not receive damage during the attack.
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The commander of U-997 reported the sinking of one transport and the torpedoing of another, as well as two sunk destroyers (they were sure about the first one and fairly sure about the second one). Apparently, the continuous attacks did not prevent Lehman from confidently observing the results of firing at transports with conventional torpedoes. The assessment of attacks on destroyers by homing torpedoes blindly turned out to be completely false.
The boats located in the Kola Bay area were included in the Faust group (12 submarines). Having missed the convoy JW-66, they began to wait for the return convoy RA-66. Since April 23, Soviet aviation has carried out many attacks on submarines, some of them were considered effective. The great activity of Soviet aviation is repeatedly noted in German reports as well. Two submarines (U-711 and U-968) were damaged at the same time, forcing them to interrupt the campaign. But these successful attacks occurred on April 30, after the passage of convoy RA-66. U-286 could have been damaged during one of the attacks before April 29. However, if this happened, the damage did not seriously affect her combat capability.
On April 26, the last known order mentioning U-286 before her death was issued: the boats of the Faust group were assigned new positions. On April 28, Suren informed the group that there were signs of the convoy leaving, and ordered them to remain undetected until they encounter it.
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Before the departure of convoy RA-66 on the evening of April 29, two British escort groups went on an anti-submarine search: the 19th group (five ships) and the 7th group (eight ships). At 18:56 the 19th group was heading north in the front line, the distance between the ships was 3,000 yards (2.7 km). At this moment, the frigate "Loch Insh" established sonar contact with the submarine. At 19:00, the ship fired a Squid salvo and received an immediate result. After 30 seconds, the heavily damaged U-307 surfaced. The frigates "Loch Shin", "Loch Insh", as well as the sloop "Signet" from the 7th group immediately opened fire on her. At 19:03, the boat sank at 69°24' north. 33°44' east. 14 people were taken prisoner, including the commander, the remaining 37 were killed.
Meanwhile, the anti-submarine search continued. The frigate "Goodall" from the 19th group detected another submarine with a 338° bearing sonar and was preparing to fire a volley from the Hedgehog mortar when an explosion was heard at 19:35. It is believed that the frigate received a torpedo in the port side under the bridge. At the same moment, the ammunition detonated, and the bow of the ship was completely destroyed. As a result of the explosion and the subsequent fire, 98 people were killed. The frigate itself burned afloat for about 6 hours, then it was finished off by British ships. Considering that none of the boats that returned to the bases carried out this attack, and U-307 had already been sunk by this time, that this was the first and last successful attack of U-286.
Immediately after the "Goodall" message about the contact, "Loch Shin" turned in the indicated direction and at 19:40 also detected an underwater target at a distance of 2,000 yards. At 19:43, a Squid salvo followed, to no avail. The frigates Loch Insh and Anguilla joined the hunt, but their attacks were also inaccurate. Finally, the frigate "Cotton" at 20:17 used Squid on a firmly established contact. An oil stain and wooden fragments appeared on the surface. The stain was spreading for the next half hour.
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For many decades, it was the analysis of documents that mainly helped to deal with controversial cases of boat sinking. Everything that could be learned on this topic as of 2011 was presented by one of the authors of this article in the collection "Secrets of the Submarine War 1914-1945" (Moscow, "Veche", 2012). Since then, not only the documents of the British radio intelligence (the "Ultra" program) have become more accessible, but, most importantly, during the testing of training tasks by the Northern Fleet, the wrecks of three German submarines were discovered.
On 21.06.2013 after having completed the exercises under the leadership of Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, in which search and rescue forces of the Northern fleet in a predetermined area successfully searched for a submarine in need of help, the small hydrographic vessel GS-278 was additionally tasked by the order of the head of the hydrographic service to perform a hydroacoustic search according to a "non-standard" scheme: in the place of death of the German submarine U-387, assumed according to English data.
At 69°40.6'N. 33°12.8'E. less than a mile from the site of the attack "Bamborough Castle" in the area of Cape Tsypnavoloksky, a side-view sonar detected an object with a length of 65 m, having similar outlines to a submarine (the length of the German submarine of the VII class is 67 m). Subsequent identification was carried out using television means.
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Based on a visual inspection, the assumption that the hull of a German submarine was found was confirmed.
The hull itself is heavily overgrown with marine organisms, entangled in fishing nets, lies on the starboard side with a roll of about 45 °. The bow area of submarine suffered the most damage.
The object was put on the maps.
The final conclusion about the tactical number of the submarine was not made due to the fact that the destroyer Karl Liebknecht also claimed victory in approximately the same area. If the destroyer's attack was successful, then this submarine could be U-286, even though it was considered extremely unlikely. In addition, the detected submarine had the upper conning tower hatch open, which made the version with the sinking of the boat by our destroyer quite plausible.
In 2016, near the assumed coordinates of the death of submarines U-286 and U-307, the search and rescue forces discovered and examined the hulls of German boats of the VII class (69°29.6'N. 33°37.3'E, 69°26.1'N. 33°41.4'E. respectively). The first was less than half a mile from the place of death of U-286 recorded in the reports, the second was one mile from the place of death of U-307. Given the inaccuracies in determining the location during the war, as well as the fact that there was no way other submarines of this class could end up in the area, there is little doubt that the discovered submarines are U-286 and U-307. It all came together: with the discovery of these submarines, the German submarine mapped in 2013 was unambiguously identified as U-387, which means it was sunk by the British forces.